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Abstract In this paper we describe a decision process frame-
work allowing an agent to decide what information it should
reveal to its neighbours within a communication graph in or-
der to maximise its utility. We assume that these neighbours
can pass information onto others within the graph. The in-
ferences made by agents receiving the messages can have
a positive or negative impact on the information providing
agent, and our decision process seeks to identify how a mes-
sage should be modified in order to be most beneficial to
the information producer. Our decision process is based on
the provider’s subjective beliefs about others in the system,
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and therefore makes extensive use of the notion of trust. Our
core contributions are therefore the construction of a model
of information propagation; the description of the agent’s
decision procedure; and an analysis of some of its proper-
ties.
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1 Introduction
Appropriate decision making by an agent operating within
a multi-agent system often requires information from other
agents. However, unless the system is fully cooperative, there
are typically both costs and benefits to divulging information
— while the agent may be able to achieve some goals, oth-
ers might be able to use this information to their advantage
later. An agent must therefore weigh up the costs and bene-
fits that information divulgence will bring it when deciding
how to act. One of the most critical factors in this calculation
is the trust placed in the entity to which one is providing the
information — an untrusted individual might pass private
information onto others, or may act upon the information in
a manner harmful to the information provider.
In this paper we seek to provide a trust based decision
mechanism for assessing the positive and negative effects of
information release to an agent. Using our mechanism, first
discussed in Bisdikian et al (2013) and expanded here, the
agent can decide how much information to provide in or-
der to maximise its own utility. We situate our work within
the context of a multi-agent system. Here, an agent must
assess the risk of divulging information to a set of other
agents, who in turn may further propagate the information.
The problem the agent faces is to identify the set of infor-
mation that must be revealed to its neighbours (who will po-
tentially propagate the information further) in order to max-
imise its own utility.
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In the context of a multi-agent system, the ability of
an agent to assess the risk of information sharing is criti-
cal when agents have to reach agreement, for example when
coordinating, negotiating or delegating activities. In many
contexts, agents have conflicting goals, and inter-agent inter-
actions must take the risk of a hidden agenda into account.
Thus, a theory of risk assessment for determining the right
level of disclosure to apply to shared information is vital in
order to avoid undesirable impacts on an information pro-
ducer.
As a concrete example, consider the work described in
Chakraborty et al (2012), where information from accelerom-
eter data attached to a person can be used to make either
white-listed inferences — that the person desires others to
infer, or black-listed inferences — which the person would
rather not reveal. For example, the person may wish a doc-
tor to be able to determine how many calories they burn in a
day, but might not want others to be able to infer their state
(e.g. sitting, running or asleep). The person must thus iden-
tify which parts of the accelerometer data should be shared
in order to enable or prevent their white- or black-listed in-
ferences. While Chakraborty et al (2012) examined how in-
ferences can be made (e.g. that the sharing of the entropy
of FFT coefficients provides a high probability of detecting
activity level and low probability of detecting activity type),
this work did not consider the impacts of sharing such infor-
mation when it is passed on to others.
In this paper we focus on the case where we assume
that black- and white-listed inferences can be made by other
agents within a system, and seek to identify what informa-
tion to provide in order to obtain the best possible outcome
for the information provider.
To illustrate such a scenario, let us consider a govern-
mental espionage agency which has successfully placed spies
within some hostile country. It must communicate with these
spies through a series of handlers, some of which may turn
out to be double-agents. It must therefore choose what in-
formation to reveal to these handlers in order to maximise
the benefits that spying can bring to it, while minimising
the damage they can do. It is clear that the choices made
by the agency depend on several factors. First, it must con-
sider the amount of trust it places in the individual spies and
handlers. Second, it must also take into account the amount
of harm these can do with any information it provides to
them. Finally, it must consider the benefits that can accrue
from providing its spies with information. The combination
of the first and second factors together provide a measure of
the negative effects of information sharing. Now when con-
sidering the second factor, an additional detail must be taken
into account, namely that the information recipients (i.e. the
spies) may already have some knowledge which, when com-
bined with the information provided by the agency, will re-
sult in additional unexpected information being inferred. There-
fore, the final level of harm which the agency may face de-
pends not on the information it provides, but instead on the
undesired inferences which hostile spies can make.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In
Section 2 we describe our model, outlining the process of
decision making that an agent performs in the presence of
white- and black-listed inferences. We concentrate on a spe-
cial case of communication in multi-agent systems, and show
how such a case can be reduced to communication between
an information provider and consumer (Section 3). We de-
scribe the decision procedure in Section 4. Section 5 pro-
vides a numeric example of the functioning of our system.
We then contrast our approach with existing work in Sec-
tion 6, and identify several avenues of future work. Sec-
tion 7 concludes the paper. Appendix A discusses the rel-
evant properties of this approach when considering continu-
ous random variables: in the following the will mainly focus
on the case of discrete random variables.
2 The Effects of Information Sharing
We consider a situation where an information producer shares
information with one or more information consumers. These
consumers can, in turn, forward the information to others,
who may also forward it on, repeating the cycle. Further-
more, since a consumer may or may not use the information
provided as expected by the provider, the producer must as-
sess the damage it will incur if the provided information is
misused. The decision problem faced by the producer is to
therefore identify an appropriate message to send to a con-
sumer which will achieve an appropriate balance between
desired and undesired effects. We assume that once a in-
formation is provided, the producer is unable to control its
spread or use further .
We begin by describing a model of such a system. As
part of our notation, we use upper-case letters, e.g. X , to
represent random variables (r.v.’s); lower-case letters, e.g. x,
to represent realisation instances of them, and FX(·) and
fX(·) to represent the probability distribution and density of
the r.v. X , respectively; Pr(·) and Pr(· | ·) to represent the
probability and conditional probability of discrete random
variables respectively.
We consider a set of agents able to interact with their
neighbours through a set of communication links, as em-
bodied by a communication graph or network. We assume
that each agent knows the topology of this network. We
introduce the concept of a Framework for Communication
Assessment FCA that considers the set of agents, the mes-
sages that can be exchanged, the communication links of
each agents, a producer that is willing to share some infor-
mation, and the recipients of the information, which are di-
rectly connected to the producer within the communication
graph.
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Definition 1 A Framework for Communication Assessment
(FCA) is a 5-ple:
〈A, C,M, ag,m〉
where:
– A is a set of agents;
– C ⊆ A × A is the set of communication links among
agents;
– M is the set of all the messages that can be exchanged;
– ag ∈ A is the producer, viz. the agent that shares infor-
mation;
– m ∈ M is a message that is sent by the producer ag and
whose impact is being assessed;
– A \ {ag} is the set of consumers.
Given a frameworkFCA, ag will make use of the proce-
dure described in this paper to determine how to share infor-
mation. This information sharing decision seeks to identify
a degree of disclosure for the original message - reducing the
information provided according to this degree of disclosure
results in a derived version of the original message, which
(informally) conveys less information than the original. As
an example, if the agency knows that “country A is going
to invade country B”, and is deciding whether to commu-
nicate this, a message of the form “country B is going to
be invaded” is a derived message, obtained when the de-
gree of disclosure is less than 1. We do not specify the exact
mapping and the corresponding mathematical properties be-
tween the degree of disclosure and the derived message in
this work, leaving this as a future avenue of research.
Definition 2 Given A a set of agents, a message m ∈ M,
agi, agj ∈ A, xi,j(m) ∈ [0, 1] is the degree of disclosure
by which agent agi will send the message m to agent agj ,
where xi,j(m) = 0 implies no sharing and xi,j(m) = 1
implies full disclosure between the two agents. We define
the disclosure function as follows:
d :M× [0, 1] 7→ M
d(·, ·) accepts a message and a degree of disclosure (for that
message) as its inputs, and returns a modified message (re-
ferred to as the disclosed portion of the original message).
In this paper, we consider a specific version of degree of dis-
closure, interpreting xi,j(m) as a conditional probability by
which agent agi will modify message m into a new message
m′ when communicating with agent agj:
xi,j(m) = Pri,j(m
′ | m)
where m′ ∈ M is a modified message of m. Note that in
this interpretation m′ = d(m,xi,j(m)) (if there are mul-
tiple messages with the same degree of disclosure relative
to m, the disclosure function d will select one among them
randomly). A more sophisticated notation of message dis-
closure level and its probabilistic interpretation, such as sep-
arating the models of measuring the relative content level of
messages and the corresponding conditional probabilities of
message transformation during communication, will be left
for our future work.
Given a FCA, the decision whether or not to share the
information with the recipient must consider the impact that
the information recipient can incur to the producer. We as-
sume that agents within the system are selfish — an infor-
mation provider will only share information if doing so pro-
vides it with some benefit but with the damage being as less
as possible. However, such a benefit and damage may be un-
certain. Therefore, when sharing information, the producer
not only considers the benefit it obtains, but must also con-
siders potential negative side effects based on the following:
1. the probability that an agent in possession of the mes-
sage will forward it onward;
2. the levels of disclosure of messages exchanged between
two agents;
3. the ability of each agent to infer knowledge from the
received (disclosed) message;
4. the impacts (i.e. positive and negative effects) that the
inferred knowledge has on the information producer.
The following definition therefore models the uncertainty
of the impact of sharing information via a random variable.
Definition 3 Given a FCA 〈A, C,M, ag,m〉, let agi ∈ A \
{ag}, Z(xag,i) ∈ Z be a r.v. which represents the impact
agent ag receives when sharing the messagemwith a degree
of disclosure xag,i with agent agi. Z is called the space of
impact. Z(xag,i) can either be
– a continuous random variable whose distribution is de-
scribed by FZ(·;xag,i) and fZ(·;xag,i), or
– a discrete random variable whose probability is Pr(z |
xag,i) where z = Z(xag,i).
The central theme of this paper is centred around Defi-
nition 3. More specifically, we focus on 1) how to derive the
distribution of impact from the disclosure degree of mes-
sages; 2) how to evaluate the positive and negative effects
of the impact; and 3) how to make decisions regarding the
disclosure degree of messages based on impact.
3 Communication Networks
We now turn our attention to communication between agents
who must send information via an intermediary. We show
that under some special conditions, such communication can
be abstracted as direct communication utilising a different
degree of disclosure. In order to show this result, we in-
troduce two operators combining disclosure degrees when
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information is shared in this way. The first operator dis-
counts the degree of disclosure based on agents within the
message path, while the second operator fuses information
which may have travelled along multiple paths.
Fig. 1 Combining disclosure degrees: single communication path
(Definition 4).
Figure 1 depicts the simplest case where the first opera-
tor can be applied. Let us suppose that there are three agents
ag1, ag2, ag3 and that ag1 plays the role of the producer of
the information m, that is shared with ag1 with a degree of
disclosure x1,2 (the message sent to ag2 is m′ = d(m,x1,2).
ag2 then shares what it received (m′) with ag3, sending it a
message d(m′, x1,3) derived from a new degree of disclo-
sure x2,3 which applies to m′ instead of m. Concerning our
scenario, it can be the case that the agency (ag1) cannot send
a message directly to its agent in the hostile country. There-
fore it has to deliver the message through an intermediate
agent ag2. Unfortunately, the agency knows that there is a
possibility that ag2 will propagate the message towards ag3,
who is an hostile spy.
The operator we introduce in Definition 4 computes the
equivalent disclosure degree (x1,2) which should be used
for deriving a new message from m that ag1 can send to
ag3 and such that d(m′, x2,3) = d(m,x1,3). We require
the introduced operator to be (i) transitive, and (ii) that the
returned value x1,3 should not be greater than x1,2. This
“monotonicity” requirement is built on the intuition that ag2
does not know the original information m, just its derived
version d(m,x1,2). It also rests on the critical assumption
that ag2 does not make any kind of inference before sharing
its knowledge. For instance, if ag1 shares with ag2 a mes-
sage with a degree of disclosure of 0.7 of the original mes-
sage m, and ag2 shares with ag3 a message with a degree
of disclosure of 0.5 of the message it received, one could ar-
gue that ag3 a message with a degree of disclosure of 0.35
of the original message m. The monotonicity requirement is
strictly related to the assumption that an agent cannot share
what it derived: this requirement will be relaxed in future
developments of the FCA framework.
Definition 4 Given a FCA 〈A, C,M, ag,m〉, for any three
agents ag1, ag2, ag3 ∈ A, 〈ag1, ag2〉, 〈ag2, ag3〉 ∈ C, let
m′ = d(m,x1,2) be the message sent by ag1 to ag2 (see
Fig. 1). Then the message sent by ag1 to ag3 is:
d(m′, x2,3) = d(m,x1,3)
where
– x1,3 = 〈x1,2〉 ⊙ 〈x2,3〉;
– ⊙ is a transitive function such that
⊙ : ([0, 1])× ([0, 1]) 7→ [0, 1]
– x1,3 ≤ x1,2.
Our second operator deals with the case where there are
multiple path that a message can traverse before reaching an
information consumer. This is the case depicted in Fig. 2,
where ag1 shares the same information with ag2 and ag3,
but filters these using different degrees of disclosure x1,2
and x1,3 for the two agents respectively. Following this, ag2
and ag3 share the information they obtained with ag4. For
instance, it can be the case that the agency, trying to reach
its agent, shows information with both ag2 and ag3, hoping
that somehow the message will eventually reach the agent.
As before, the agency is aware that both ag2 and ag3 have
contacts with an enemy spy ag4.
Fig. 2 Combining disclosure degrees: multiple communication path
(Definition 5).
We therefore define a transitive operator (in Definition 5
below) which when used with the operator defined in Def-
inition 4 above, provides us with an equivalent degree of
disclosure as if the message was sent directly from ag1 to
ag4 (x1,4). This operator must honour the monotonicity re-
quirement — the derived degree of disclosure x1,4 cannot
be greater than the minimum of the disclosure degrees used
for sharing the information with ag2 (x1,2) and with ag3
(x1,3). As for the previous operator,we assume that inter-
mediate agents do not make any inferences before sharing
information.
Definition 5 Given a FCA 〈A, C,M, ag,m〉, ∀ag1, ag2, ag3,
ag4 ∈ A, 〈ag1, ag2〉, 〈ag1, ag3〉, 〈ag2, ag4〉, 〈ag3, ag4〉 ∈ C,
let m′ = d(m,x1,2) be the message sent by ag1 to ag2, and
let m′′ = d(m,x1,3) be the message sent by ag1 to ag3 (see
Fig. 2). Then there is a merge function that merges the mes-
sage sent by ag2 to ag4, with the message sent by ag3 to ag4
as follows:
merge(d(m′, x2,4), d(m
′′, x3,4)) = d(m,x1,4)
where
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– x1,4 is defined as:
x1,4 = (〈x1,2〉 ⊙ 〈x2,4〉)⊕ (〈x1,3〉 ⊙ 〈x3,4〉) ;
– ⊕ is a transitive function s.t.
⊕ : [0, 1]× [0, 1] 7→ [0, 1]
– x1,4 ≤ min {x1,2, x1,3}.
Having described the properties required of ⊙ and ⊕,
we do not instantiate them further. However, any operators
which satisfy these properties allow us to treat the trans-
mission of information between any two agents in the net-
work as a transmission between directly connected agents,
subject to changes in the degree of disclosure. Computing
this degree of disclosure requires ag to make some assump-
tions, which can be computed from specific ⊙ and ⊕ in-
stantiations. In the remainder of the paper, we therefore con-
sider communication only from an information source to the
information consumer (ignoring intermediary agents), and
deal with a single degree of disclosure used in this commu-
nication. This “derived” degree of disclosure is computed
using a specific instantiation of ⊙ and ⊕ by considering the
message path through the network from the information pro-
ducer to the consumer..
After a message m ∈ M from producer ag propagates
through the communication work, we obtain a distribution
over the messages that a consumer agq can receive:Prq(mi)
for each mi ∈ M. We represent this distribution through
vector notation:
xq =


Prq(m1)
Prq(m2)
.
.
.
Prq(mM )


Here, M = |M| is the size of the message space. If the final
message agent agq can receive is deterministic and it is mi,
then the final message distribution becomes a unit vector:
eq,i =
[
0 . . . 1 . . . 0
]T
whose ith entry is 1 and other entries are zeros.
4 The Decision Process
We now turn our attention to the core of the decision process
for assessing impact, which is based on the following defi-
nitions of inferred knowledge and of the impact that inferred
knowledge has on ag.
Definition 6 Given a FCA 〈A, C,M, ag,m〉, let xag,q be
the level of disclosure of the message m that the producer
ag eventually discloses to consumer agq. We describe the
amount of knowledge that agq can infer from the message
m as a random variable yq = I(xag,q) ∈ Y which is either
– a continuous random variable whose cumulative distri-
bution and density function areFIq (·;xag,q) and fIq (·;xag,q)
respectively; or
– a discrete random variable whose distribution is
Pr(yq | xag,q).
Y is called the space of inference.
As we have previously discussed, the provision of infor-
mation enables a recipient to make inferences, which have
an effect, or impact on the information producer. We cap-
ture this impact as a point within an impact space Z. Since
the producer does not have full information regarding a con-
sumer’s knowledge, we model impact probabilistically.
Definition 7 Given a FCA 〈A, C,M, ag,m〉, let yq be the
inference that a consumer agq can make when the producer
ag disseminates the message m through the communica-
tion network. We define the impact of the inferences that
agent agq on the producer ag as a real random variable zq =
Zq(yq) ∈ Z which is either
– a continuous random variable whose cumulative distri-
bution and density function are FZq (·; yq) and fZq (·; yq)
respectively, or
– a discrete random variable whose distributed is
Pr(zq | yq).
The range Z is called the impact space.
We concentrate on two types of impact, namely the positive
and negative effects of the inferences made by the consumer
on the producer. We respectively refer to these as the benefits
and risks to the producer. Unlike standard utility theory, we
do not, in general, assume that benefits and risks are directly
comparable, and these therefore serve as two dimensions of
the impact space.
– Benefit B: Let b ∈ B be the producer ag’s evaluation
of the benefit of inferences a consumer agq can make
following the receipt of a message. Following Defini-
tion 7, we model benefit via either a continuous random
variableBq(yq) with cumulative distribution and density
function FBq (·; yq) and fBq (·; yq) respectively; or a dis-
crete random variable whose distributed is Pr(bq | yq).
– Risk R: Let r ∈ R be the producer ag’s evaluation of
the risk of the harm of inferences a consumer agq can
make following the receipt of a message. Following Def-
inition 7, we model risk vie either a continuous random
variableRq(yq) with cumulative distribution and density
function FRq (·; yq) and fRq (·; yq) respectively; or a dis-
crete random variable whose distributed is Pr(rq | yq).
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Fig. 3 The probabilities of inference and trust following sharing.
In Bisdikian et al (2013) we show that several interesting
properties holds in the case of continuous r.v.’s. However, in
this paper we will extend the proposal previously discussed
in the domain of discrete r.v.’s. An interested reader can find
in Appendix A.
The random variable Bq implicitly captures an aspect of
the producer’s trust in the consumer, as it reflects the for-
mer’s belief that the consumer will utilise the information
in the manner it desires. Similarly, the random variable Rq
captures the notion of distrust in the consumer, describing
the belief that the consumer will utilise the information in a
harmful manner. Note that when considering repeated inter-
actions, these random variables will evolve as the producer
gathers experience with various consumers. In such a situ-
ation each of them could represent either a prior distribu-
tion or a steady state. In the current work, we assume that
a steady state has been reached, allowing us to ignore the
problem of updating the distribution. When the context is
clear, we drop the subscript notation in our r.v.’s.
Figure 3 provides a graphical interpretation of inference
(Definition 6) and impact (Definition 7), distinguishing be-
tween risk and benefit, when a producer ag shares a mes-
sage m with a degree xag,q with a consumer agq. Given
d(m,xag,q), the consumer infers yq drawn from all possi-
ble inferences. This results in an impact zq drawn from the
space of possible impacts, which is conditioned on the infer-
ence yq made by the consumer. This impact zq can be either
a risk (rq) or a benefit (bq).
By assuming that the impact zq ∈ Z is independent of
the degree of disclosure xag,q of a message m ∈ M given
the inferred information yq ∈ Y, we can represent the infer-
ence distribution Iq(·) and the impact distribution Zq(·) as
conditional probability tables in matrix notation.
The inference distribution of agent agq corresponds to
the following matrix:
Iq =


Pr(y1 | m1) Pr(y1 | m2) · · · Pr(y1 | mM )
Pr(y2 | m1) Pr(y2 | m2) · · · Pr(y2 | mM )
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Pr(yN | m1) Pr(yN | m2) · · · Pr(yN | mM )


Each entry Pr(yi | mj) represents the probability that agent
agq makes inference yi ∈ Y when receiving message mi ∈
M. The ith column of Iq corresponds to the inference dis-
tribution that can be made from receiving the disclosed mes-
sage mi ∈ M. Note that every column will sum up to 1 as
we require that ΣNj=1Pr(bj | mi) = 1 for a valid condi-
tional probability. The size of matrix Iq is N × M where
N = |Y| and M = |M|. As Iq is a valid conditional proba-
bility table, there are (N − 1)×M number of independent
parameters in Iq .
Similarly, the impact conditional probability of agent agq
can be represented by an impact matrix:
Zq =


Pr(z1 | y1) Pr(z1 | y2) · · · Pr(z1 | yN)
Pr(z2 | y1) Pr(z2 | y2) · · · Pr(z2 | yN)
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Pr(zK | y1) Pr(zK | y2) · · · Pr(zK | yN )


Each entry Pr(zk | yj) represents the probability that agent
agq cause impact zk ∈ Z to the producer ag when agq can
makes inference yj ∈ Y. The jth column of Zq corresponds
to the impact distribution that can occur if the jth inference
yj can be reached. Again, every column will sum up to 1 as
ΣKk=1Pr(zk | yj) = 1. |Zq| = K ×N where N = |Y| and
K = |Z|. Zq has N × (K − 1) independent parameters.
Corollary 1 Assume that the impact z is independent of the
degree of disclosure x given the inferred information y. Given
xq , Iq and Zq , the distribution of the impact z˜q that agent
agq can make to the producer ag is be computed by:
z˜q = Zq × Iq × xq
where
z˜q =


Pr(z1)
Pr(z2)
.
.
.
Pr(zK)


whose entry Pr(zk) is the probability in which agent agq
causes the kth impact to the producer ag. Pr(zk) is the
probability marginalizing over all possible messages and in-
ferences. z˜q is called the the impact distribution vector of a
consumer agq.
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Corresponding to the impact distribution vector z˜q , we lay-
out the impact evaluation into a vector zq , defined as fol-
lows.
zq =


z1
z2
.
.
.
zK


where K = |Z|. Entry zk in zq is the k-th impact that agent
agq can make to the producer. zq is called the impact vector
by agent agq.
Definition 8 Given a FCA 〈A, C,M, ag,m〉, z˜q (the im-
pact probability vector) and zq (the impact vector) regarding
agent agq. The expected impact regarding agent agq is
E{Zq} = z
T
q × z˜q.
Since the impact can be either a benefit or a risk, Zq
can be specialised in ZBq (benefits probability matrix) or ZRq
(risk probability matrix). Correspondingly, the distribution
of impact can be either a benefit distribution or a risk distri-
bution, b˜q (benefits distribution vector) or r˜q (risk distribu-
tion vector); the impact vector can be either a benefit vector
bq or a risk vector rq; the expected impact E{zq} can either
be the expected benefit E{Bq} or the expected risk E{Rq}.
For notation clarity, we explicitly list benefit vector bq and
risk vector rq respectively as follows.
bq =


b1
b2
.
.
.
bKB


where KB = |B|. Entry bk in bq is the k-th benefit the
producer can obtain regarding agent agq.
rq =


r1
r2
.
.
.
rKR


where KR = |R|. Entry rk is the k-th risk the producer is
concerned with regarding agent agq.
We can now define the net benefit of sharing information
as follows.
Definition 9 Given a FCA 〈A, C,M, ag,m〉, the expected
benefit E{Bq} and the expected risk E{Rq} regarding an
agent agq ∈ A \ {ag}, the net benefit for the producer to
share information with agq is described by (assuming that
the values for risk and benefit can be compared and are
scaled appropriately for comparison):
Cq = Bq −Rq.
With an average, the expected net benefit is defined as:
E{Cq} = E{Bq −Rq}.
Corollary 2 Assume that the impact z is independent of the
degree of disclosure x given the inferred information y. For
agent agq, given the message disclosure distribution xq; the
inference conditional distribution Iq; the benefit conditional
distribution Bq; the risk conditional distribution Rq; the
benefit evaluation bq; and the risk evaluation rq. The ex-
pected benefit, expected cost, and expected net benefit that
agent agq can provide to the producer ag can be respectively
computed as follows:
E{Bq} = b
T
q × Z
B
q × Iq × xq (1)
E{Rq} = r
T
q × Z
R
q × Iq × xq (2)
E{Cq} =
(
b
T
q × Z
B
q − r
T
q × Z
R
q
)
× Iq × xq (3)
Assume that there is a bijection between the spaces of benefit
impact and cost impact, namelyBq(yq) = f(Rq(yq)) where
f is a bijection. And Bq(yq) and f(Rq(yq)) have the same
distribution after the mapping f represented by the matrix
Zq. Then the expected net benefit can be simplified:
E{Cq} =
(
b
T
q − r
T
q
)
× Zq × Iq × xq.
5 An Example
To illustrate our proposal, let us suppose that British Intel-
ligence (BI) has two spies, James and Alec, in place in
France. James is a clever agent, very loyal to Britain, while
Alec is not as smart, and his trustworthiness is highly ques-
tionable. At some point, BI informs the spies that in three
weeks France will be invaded by a European country: it
hopes that James and Alec can recruit new agents in France
thanks to this information. However, the intelligence agency
does not specify how this invasion will take place, although
they already know it is very likely to come from the East.
However, both James and Alec are aware of the following
additional pieces of information, namely that Spain, Bel-
gium and Italy have no interest in invading France, while
Germany does. BI does not want to share the information
that the invasion will be started by Germany, because they
are the only ones aware of these plans, and a leak would
result in a loss of credibility for the UK government. There-
fore, British Intelligence has to assess the risk in order to
determine whether or not it is acceptable to inform its spies
that France will be invaded by an European country.
Formally, we can represent the above exampleFCABI =
〈ABI , CBI ,MBI , agBI ,mBI〉, where:
– {BI, James,Alec} ⊆ ABI ;
– {〈BI, James〉, 〈James,BI〉, 〈BI,Alec〉, 〈Alec,BI〉} ⊆
CBI ;
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– {m1,m2} ⊆MBI with:
– m1: France will be invaded by Germany;
– m2: France will be invaded by a European country;
– agBI = BI;
– mBI = m1;
– {James,Alec} are the consumers.
Suppose that xBI,James = xBI,Alec = x. In other words,
BI uses the same disclosure degree with both James and
Alec.
In addition, d(m1, x) = m2, where
– m1: France will be invaded by Germany;
– m2: France will be invaded by a European country;
We focus on the case where BI is sharing m2 with Alec
and James.
Fig. 4 A simple binary inference/impact case.
To simplify the formalisation of this scenario, we will
consider only discrete random variables, allowing probabil-
ity mass functions to be used in place of densities. As il-
lustrated in Figure 4, inferences can be y0 or y1, with BI
believing that an information consumer will make such an
inference with probability u(m1)q and 1 − u(m1)q respec-
tively if receiving messagem1, and with probability u(m2)q
and 1−u(m2)q respectively if receiving messagem2. Clearly,
our intention is to keep the original message (m1) confiden-
tial, while sharing m2. The inference y0 is m2 = “France
will be invaded by a European country”, while y1 is m1 =
“France will be invaded by Germany”.
For each of the possible inferences there are two levels
of risk, denoted with rA and rB . The risk, as well as the
inferences, are independent of the agent. For simplicity, we
associate a utility cost with these two outcomes, of 10000
and 100000 respectively, as shown in the Figure. In other
words, the risk rA is 10K and represents the risk of either
John or Alec get captured when they are trying to recruit
new agents, while the impact rB is 100K and represents the
loss of credibility for the UK government due to the sharing
of information with enemy. For the sake of the example, we
will consider a fixed utility for benefit of B¯ = 25K .
With the probabilities shown in the figure, an informa-
tion producing agent is characterised by the tuple α =
〈u(m1)q, u(m2)q, w(y0)q, w(1)q〉whereu(m1)q = Prq(y0 |
m1) (to be read as “the probability that agent agq will in-
fer y0 given m”), u(m2)q = Prq(y0 | m2), w(y0)q =
Prq(rA | y0) and w(y1)q = Prq(rA | y1). Therefore,
when we only concern about the result when message m1
is eventually delivered to the agents, James’ behaviour can
be characterised by the tuple α1 = 〈0, 0.1, 0.9, 0.9〉, while
Alec is characterised by the tuple α2 = 〈0, 0.6, 0.6, 0.4〉,
which shows that if Alec infers that the invader will be the
Germany, it is more likely that he will defect, leading to the
worst possible impact for the information provider BI .
According to the formalism presented in this paper, we
have the following space of messages:
M = {m1,m2}
Assume that m1 is the final message received by the agents,
we have the following vectors of eventual disclosure degree:
xJohn = xAlec =
(
0
1
)
Then, according to Figure 4, the space of inference are
composed of two possible inferences:
Y = {y0, y1}
Clearly, we have to distinguish between John and Alec’s
ability to make inferences:
IJohn =
(
uJohn(1) uJohn(2)
1− uJohn(1) 1− uJohn(2)
)
=
(
0 0.1
1 0.9
)
while
IAlec =
(
uAlec uAlec(2)
1− uAlec 1− uAlec(2)
)
=
(
0 0.6
1 0.4
)
The risks, independent of the agent with whom informa-
tion is shared is as follows:
r =
(
rA
rB
)
=
(
10K
100K
)
Taking the inferred messages into account, we obtain the
following.
RJohn =
(
w(y0)John w(y1)John
1− w(y0)John 1− w(y1)John
)
=
(
0.9 0.9
0.1 0.1
)
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while
RAlec =
(
w(y0)Alec w(y1)Alec
1− w(y0)Alec 1− w(y1)Alec
)
=
(
0.6 0.4
0.4 0.6
)
Moreover, since we considered a fixed benefit
b =
(
B¯
)
these values depends on the inferred messages with the fol-
lowing distribution:
B =
(
1
2
1
2
)
When agent BI shares message m at disclosure level
x with a particular consumer agent agx, the average risk
E{Rq} anticipated by BI is given by
E{Rq} =
(
rA rB
)
×
(
w(y0)q w(y1)q
1− w(y0)q 1− w(y1)q
)
×
(
u(m1)q u(m2)q
1− u(m1)q 1− u(m2)q
)
×
(
0
1
)
= rB − (rB − rA)
·
{
u(m2)q · [w(y0)q − w(y1)q] + w(y1)q
}
.
(4)
As expected, we obtain an expected risk for James of
(E{RJohn} = 10K), while for Alec, we obtain (E{RAlec} =
53.2K).
Similarly, the expected net benefit E{Cq} for the spies
is as follows.
E{Cq} =
((
B¯
)
×
(
1
2
1
2
)
−(
rA rB
)
×
(
w(y0)q w(y1)q
1− w(y0)q 1− w(y1)q
))
×(
u(m1)q u(m2)q
1− u(m1)q 1− u(m2)q
)
×
(
0
1
)
= B¯ − rB + (rB − rA)·{
u(m2)q · [w(y0)q − w(y1)q] + w(y1)q
}
.
(5)
Since E{Cq} ≥ 0 is desired, we must necessarily have:
rB − B¯ ≤ (rB − rA)·{
u(m2)q · [w(y0)q − w(y1)q] + w(y1)q
}
⇔
rB − B¯
(rB − rA)
≤ u(m2)q · [w(y0)q − w(y1)q] + w(y1)q ⇔
rB − B¯
(rB − rA)
≤ u(m2)q · w(y0)q + (1− u(m2)q) · w(y1)q ≤ 1.
(6)
The right hand side of the expression above represents the
probability of experiencing impacts at level rA (see Fig. 4),
which immediately necessitates that B¯ ≥ rA. In other words,
the minimum valuation of the information should be at least
as large as the minimum impact expected to occur, cf. Defi-
nition 9.
From Equation 6, which assesses the risk and the trust
model (the tuples in this discrete case), we can see that BI
can share the information that France is going to be invaded
with James ( 75
90
≤ 0.9 ≤ 1), but not with Alec ( 75
90
 0.52 ≤
1).
6 Discussion and Future Work
The work described in this paper makes use of an unspeci-
fied trust model as a core input to the decision making pro-
cess. Our probabilistic underpinnings are intended to be suf-
ficiently general to enable it to be instantiated with arbi-
trary models, such as Jøsang and Ismail (2002); Teacy et al
(2006). Unlike these models, our work is not intended to
compute a specific trust value based on some set of interac-
tions, but rather to decide how to use the trust value output
by the models.
The use of trust within a decision making system is now
a prominent research topic, see Castelfranchi and Falcone
(2010); Urbano et al (2013) for an overview. However, the
most work in this area assumes that agents will interact with
some most trusted party, as determined by the trust model.
This assumption reflects the basis of trust models on action
and task delegation rather than information sharing. Burnett
et al (2011) is an exception to this trend; while still con-
sidering tasks, Burnett explicitly takes into account the fact
that dealing with a trusted party may be more expensive, and
thus leads to a lower utility when a task has relatively low
potential harmful effects. Burnett’s model therefore consid-
ers both risk and reward when selecting agents for interac-
tion. However, Burnett situated his work using utility theory,
while the present work allows for a more complex impact
space to be used.
Another body of work relevant to this paper revolves
around information leakage. Work such as Mardziel et al
(2011) considers what information should be revealed to an
agent given that this agent should not be able to make spe-
cific inferences. Unlike our work, Mardziel et al (2011) does
not consider the potential benefits associated with revealing
information.
Finally, there is a broad field of research devoted to as-
sessing risk in different contexts. As summarised in Wang
and Williams (2011), which compares seven definitions of
trust1, the notion of risk is the result of some combination
1 Although not considered in Wang and Williams (2011), the defini-
tion provided in Castelfranchi and Falcone (2010) follows the others.
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of uncertainty about some outcome, and a (negative) payoff
for an intelligent agent and his goals. While this definition
is widely accepted (with minor distinctions), different au-
thors have different point of view when it comes to formally
define what is meant by uncertainty. In Kaplan and Gar-
rick (1981), instead of providing a formal definition of risk,
the authors introduce a scenario-based risk analysis method,
considering (i) the scenario, (ii) its likelihood, and (iii) the
consequences of that scenario. They also introduce the no-
tion of uncertainty in the definition of likelihood and of con-
sequences. Doing so allows them to address the core prob-
lem of such models, viz. that complete information of all
possible scenarios is required. The connection between risk
and trust has been the subject of several studies, e.g. Tan
and Thoen (2002) shows a formal model based on epistemic
logic for dealing with trust in electronic commerce where
the risk evaluation is one of the components that contribute
to the overall trust evaluation, Das and Teng (2004) proposes
a conceptual framework showing the strict correspondence
between risk and some definition of trust, Castelfranchi and
Falcone (2010) discusses the connection between risk and
trust in delegation. However, to our knowledge our work is
the first attempt to consider risk assessment in trust-based
decision making about information sharing.
There are several potential avenues for future work. First,
we have assumed that trust acts as an input to our deci-
sion process, and have therefore not considered the inter-
play between risk and trust. We therefore seek to investigate
how both these quantities evolve over time. To this aim, we
also will investigate the connections between the shown ap-
proach and those based on game theory like Goffman (1970),
as suggested by (van der Torre, personal communication,
1st Aug 2013) during the presentation of Bisdikian et al
(2013). Another aspect of work we intend to examine is how
the trust process affects disclosure decisions by intermedi-
ate agents with regards to the information they receive. We
note that agents might not propagate information from an
untrusted source onwards, as they might not believe it. Such
work, together with a more fine grained representation of the
agents’ internal beliefs could lead to interesting behaviours
such as agents lying to each other Caminada (2009). Other
scenarios of interest can be easily envisaged, and they will
be investigated in future work. For instance, a slightly mod-
ified version of the framework proposed in this paper can be
used for determining the degree of disclosure in order to be
reasonably sure that a desired part of the message will actu-
ally reach a specific agent with which we do not know how
to communicate. This is the situation when an organisation
tries to reach an undercover agent by sharing some infor-
mation with the enemy, hoping that somehow the relevant
pieces of information will eventually reach the agent. Our
long term goal is to utilise our approach to identify which
message to introduce so as to maximise agent utility, given
a knowledge rich (but potentially incomplete or uncertain)
representation of a multi-agent system.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we described a framework enabling an agent
to determine how much information it should disclose to
others in order to maximise its utility. This framework as-
sumes that any disclosure could be propagated onwards by
the receiving agents, and that certain agents should not be
allowed to infer some information, while it is desirable that
others do make inferences from the propagated information.
We showed that our framework respects certain intuitions
with regards to the level of disclosure used by an agent, and
also identified how much an information provider should
disclose in order to achieve some form of equilibrium with
regards to its utility. Potential applications can be envisaged
in strategic contexts, where pieces of information are shared
across several partners which can result in the achievement
of a hidden agenda.
To our knowledge, this work is the first to take trust and
risk into account when reasoning about information sharing,
and we are pursuing several exciting avenues of future work
in order to make the framework more applicable to a larger
class of situations.
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A The Case of Continuous Random Variables
By utilising Definitions 6 and 7 we can describe the impact of disclos-
ing a message to the consumers on the producer ag.
Proposition 1 Given a FCA 〈A, C,M, ag,m〉; a consumer agq ∈
A; and the message d(m, xag,q) received by agq . Let yq be the in-
formation inferred by agq according to the r.v. Iq(xag,q) (with prob-
ability ≈ fIq (yq; xag,q) dyq). Then, assuming that the impact zq is
independent of the degree of disclosure xag,q given the inferred infor-
mation yq , ag expects an impact zq described by the r.v. Zq(xag,q)
with density:
fZq (zq ;xag,q) =
∫
1
0
fZq (zq ; yq) fIq (yq ;xag,q) dyq.
Proof
FZq (zq ;xag,q) = Pr{Zq ≤ zq |xag,q}
=
∫
1
0
Pr{Zq ≤ zq, Iq = yq|xag,q} dyq
=
∫
1
0
Pr{Zq ≤ zq|Iq = yq , xag,q}fIq (yq ;xag,q) dyq
=
∫
1
0
FZq (zq; yq) fIq (yq; xag,q) dyq,
The density function is easily derived from the distribution
FZq (zq; xag,q) since fZq (zq ;xag,q) =
d
dzq
FZq (zq ;xag,q). ⊓⊔
Moreover, any time we need a single value characterisation of a
distribution, we can exploit the same idea of descriptors of a random
variable, by introducing descriptors for trust and risk.
Definition 10 Let h(·) be a function defined on [0, 1], and y ∈ [0, 1]
be a level of inference. We define
t
Zq
h (x) =
∫
1
0
h(w) fZq (w; y) dw, (7)
to be the y-trust descriptor induced by h(·).
We can do the same to obtain a impact descriptor:
Definition 11 Let h(·) be a function defined on [0, 1], and x ∈ [0, 1]
be a level of disclosure.We define
t
Zq
h (x) =
∫
1
0
h(w) fZq (w;x) dw, (8)
to be the x-impact descriptor induced by h(·).
Typical h(·) include the moment generating functions, such as
h(k) = k, k2, etc., and entropy h(k) = −ln
(
fK(k)
)
for the den-
sity of some r.v. K. In the following we use the expectation as the risk
descriptor, leaving consideration of other possible functions for future
work.
Finally, let us illustrate two notable properties of our model. The
first one is with regards to the case where a consumer can derive the
full original message, which, unsurprisingly, leads to the worst case
impact.
Proposition 2 When a consumer is capable of gaining maximum knowl-
edge, then fI(y;x) = δ(y−1), where δ(·) is the Dirac delta function,
and FZ(z;x) = FZ(z) , FZ(z; 1), i.e., the risk coincides with the
1-trust (Definition 7).
Proof By the definition of the inference r.v. I(x), when agx is believed
to gain maximum knowledge then the density fI(y;x) carries all its
weight at the point y = 1 for all x. Hence, fI(y;x) = δ(y−1) and it
follows from the definition of the Dirac delta function, see also Prop. 1
FZ(z;x) =
∫
1
0
FZ(z; y) fI(y;x) dy
=
∫
1
0
FZ(z; y) δ(y − 1) dy = FZ(z; 1). (9)
⊓⊔
The second property pertains to the case where agent ag shares in-
formation with more than one consumer. Such situations are typically
non-homogeneous as the trust and impact levels with regards to each
consumer are different. Clearly, it is beneficial to identify conditions
where these impacts balance (and, hence, indicate crossover thresh-
olds) across the multiple agents.
For two agents ag1, ag2 having corresponding inference and be-
havioural trust distributions FIj (y;x) and FZj (z; y), j ∈ {1, 2}, for
the shared information to have similar impact, x1 and x2 should be
selected, such that the following holds.
FZ1 (z;x1) = FZ2(z; x2) ⇔∫
1
0
FZ1(z; y) fI1(y;x1) dy =
∫
1
0
FZ2(z; y) fI2(y;x2) dy.
(10)
Note that the above relationship implies the r.v.s Z1 and Z2 are drawn
from the same distribution. Such a requirement is typically unrealistic.
Therefore in general one may want to consider equalities on the aver-
age, such as, finding x1 and x2 satisfying the following for appropriate
g(·) functions.
E{g(Z1(x1))} = E{g(Z2(x2))}, (11)
Proposition 3 Given that g(z) = z, in order to attain the same level
of impact when ag shares information with ag1, ag2, the degrees of
disclosure x1 and x2 for ag1, ag2 respectively must satisfy the fol-
lowing.
EI1
{
E{Z1(x1)|I1}
}
= EI2
{
E{Z2(x2)|I2}
}
. (12)
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Proof The case where g(z) = z corresponds to the regular averaging
operator, and (11) becomes:
∫
1
0
∫
1
0
zfZ1(z; y) fI1 (y;x1) dy dz
=
∫
1
0
∫
1
0
zfZ2(z; y) fI2(y;x2) dy dz
⇔∫
1
0
fI1 (y;x1)
[∫
1
0
zfZ1(z; y) dz
]
dy
=
∫
1
0
fI2(y;x2)
[∫
1
0
zfZ2(z; y) dz
]
dy
⇔
EI1
{
E{Z1(x1)|I1}
}
= EI2
{
E{Z2(x2)|I2}
}
.
⊓⊔
